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HEALTH LAW
I. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS HAVE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
THE FEDERAL MEDICAID ACT
In Anco, Inc. v. State Health and Human Services Finance Com-
mission' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that private health
care providers have a private right of action under the federal Medi-
caid Act.2 After finding that the health care providers had standing
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3 the supreme court reversed a permanent in-
junction and allowed the South Carolina Health and Human Services
Finance Commission (Commission) to implement a new reimburse-
ment policy that limits nursing home providers' long-term capital lease
agreement costs to historical capital costs. The costs are limited now to
depreciation and interest as incurred by nursing home providers that
own their own facilities.4
As part of the Medicaid program, enacted as Title XIX of the So-
cial Security Act,5 Congress provided for a federal and state partner-
ship to allocate the costs of providing health care to qualified individu-
als. Under the Act, each state must designate a single state agency to
administer the state Medicaid plan.6 The state designated the Com-
mission as the agency to administer the Medicaid plan in South Caro-
lina.7 Within the context of a federally approved state Medicaid plan,8
the Commission provides for reimbursement payments to skilled and
intermediate care nursing facilities. At all times, the Commission must
assure the federal government, specifically the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, that the payments under the plan "are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs ... incurred by efficiently
and economically operated facilities . ..."9
In Anco the plaintiffs included many nursing home providers that
contracted with the state to provide health care services to Medicaid
eligible patients on a per day, per patient rate. Providers received re-
1. 300 S.C. 432, 388 S.E.2d 780 (1989).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982).
3. (1982).
4. Anco, Inc., 300 S.C. at 434, 388 S.E.2d at 783.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1982).
6. Id. § 1396a(a)(5).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-6-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
8. 42 C.F.R. § 447.253 (1987).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982).
1
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imbursement for their capital costs associated either with the lease or
with ownership of their nursing home facility as part of their opera-
tions costs. The plaintiffs leased the nursing homes in which they pro-
vided services. The state Medicaid plan, administered by the Commis-
sion, provided for capital cost reimbursement with a ceiling of $7.79
per patient per day.10 The nursing home providers' specific capital
costs were either the actual lease costs for these facilities that were
leased by providers or depreciation and interest for providers that
owned their own facility.
The Commission amended the state plan to provide that the capi-
tal cost reimbursement for providers that leased their facilities was
limited to the historical cost (depreciation and interest) of providers
who owned their own facilities. The policy applied only to lease agree-
ments entered into prior to December 15, 1981, because a similar pol-
icy already had been in effect for those lease agreements entered into
after December 15, 1981.11
Each plaintiff in this case had long-term lease agreements that had
been executed prior to December 15, 1981. The plaintiffs consolidated
their claims and sought a permanent injunction to prohibit the imple-
mentation of the amended state plan and corresponding reductions in
their capital reimbursement rates. The trial court granted a permanent
injunction and held that the state plan (1) violated the Boren Amend-
ment (federal Medicaid statute), (2) constituted a deprivation of prop-
erty without just compensation, (3) violated the equal protection
clause, (4) was arbitrary and capricious, and (5) violated 42 U.S.C. §
1983.12
On appeal, the Commission first argued that the plaintiffs did not
have standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to contest the proposed reim-
bursement policy under the Medicaid Act because Congress had not
created a specific, enforceable statutory right. 3 The court disagreed
and held that plaintiffs had standing under Virginia Hospital Associa-
tion v. Baliles.1 In Baliles the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Medicaid
Act's statutory language and legislative history to imply a "congres-
sional intent to allow providers a right of action against State failure to
comply with federal Medicaid requirements."' 5 Accordingly, the plain-
10. Anco, Inc., 300 S.C. at 434, 388 S.E.2d at 782-83 (1989).
11. If actual lease costs are higher than the interest and depreciation costs of the
owner of the facility, the state will not reimburse the provider at the higher actual lease
cost rate. Id. at 436, 388 S.E.2d at 783.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 437, 388 S.E.2d at 783-84.
14. 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 110
S. Ct. 2510 (1990).
15. Id. at 658. Two other circuit courts and several district courts have recognized a
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tiffs' challenge was allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Second, the Commission argued that the state's proposed reim-
bursement rate limitations did not violate the Medicaid Act or related
federal regulations. According to the Act, the state must reimburse
providers using rates that are "reasonable and adequate to meet the
costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities."" The providers challenged the state's specific capital reim-
bursement rate as inadequate because their individual facility costs
were the result of efficient and economic operations.11 Relying on
Friedman v. Perales'8 the supreme court disagreed and held that the
proper analysis is to examine the Commission's overall reimbursement
rates within the context of the Act. 9
Furthermore, the Anco court held that the evidence did not indi-
cate that the proposed reimbursement rate limitations were arbitrary
and capricious cutbacks based solely on budgetary considerations.
Rather, the Commission claimed the impetus for the proposed policy
was to enable providers to shift their money expenditures from facility
costs to patient services costs.20
Third, the Commission argued that the proposed reimbursement
policy did not deny the plaintiffs equal protection under the law. In
1981 the Commission decided to use historical costs as the basis for
capital cost reimbursement. Consequently, the plaintiffs in this case al-
ready had negotiated long-term leases prior to 1981 that were not sub-
ject to the new policy. The supreme court, therefore, held that the pro-
posed policy supported, rather than violated equal treatment of all
nursing home providers under the state's Medicaid reimbursement
plan.'
1
private right of action under the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act. See, e.g., West
Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 21 (3d Cir. 1989); Colorado Health Care
Ass'n v. Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 842 F.2d 1158, 1164 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988); Coos
.Bay Care Center v. Oregon, 803 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806
(1987); AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v. Reagen, 713 F. Supp. 1535 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Pinnacle
Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 719 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); St. Tammany Parish
Hosp. Serv. Dist. v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 677 F. Supp. 455
(E.D. La. 1988). Other courts have refused to recognize a private right of action under
the Medicaid Act. See, e.g., Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1986); Illinois
Health Care Ass'n v. Suter, 719 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. ]MI. 1989); Vantage Healthcare Corp.
v. Virginia Bd. of Medical Assistance Servs., 684 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Va. 1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982).
17. Anco Inc., 300 S.C. at 438, 388 S.E.2d at 783.
18. 668 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (provider's
capital cost reimbursement rates alone do not warrant inference that overall reimburse-
ment rates violate federal Medicaid Act).
19. Anco, Inc., 300 S.C. at 439, 388 S.E.2d at 785.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 441, 388 S.E.2d at 785-86.
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Fourth, the Commission argued that the proposed policy did not
constitute inverse condemnation. The supreme court agreed for three
reasons. First, in Wilmac Corp. v. Heckler22 a Pennsylvania District
Court stated that "[a]s long as [the provider] continues to receive rea-
sonable and adequate reimbursement, it has not been deprived of its
property interest, if any, in Medicaid funds. ' 23 Second, the supreme
court noted that in its prior decision, the plaintiffs failed to show that
the proposed reimbursement policy violated the "reasonable and ade-
quate" standard. Accordingly, the plaintiffs also failed to show suffi-
cient basis for their inverse condemnation claim. Finally, the court
noted that provider participation in the Medicaid program is
voluntary.
2'
Fifth, the Commission argued that the proposed reimbursement
policy was not retroactive or arbitrary rule making. The court held that
the policy had not been applied retroactively because it only had pro-
spective application and it merely extended the future application of a
rule which applied already to the majority of nursing home providers.25
Finally, the court held that the policy was not arbitrary because the
court acknowledged the policy's purpose to shift provider expenditures
from facilities to patient case services, an outcome that it related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.20
Ellen A. Mercer
22. 633 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1986), vacated as not ripe, 811 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.
1987).
23. Id. at 1008.
24, See Minnesota Ass'n. of Health Facilities, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub. Wel-
fare, 742 F.2d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985) (voluntary
participation forecloses possibility of taking of private property).
25. Anco, Inc., 300 S.C. at 443, 388 S.E.2d at 786-87.
26. Id.
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